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DDI-1332-74

1 May 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT : FCRC's (RAND) Access to Intelligence

1. Rather than talking about access to intelligence by FCRCs in general, let's focus on RAND's access in particular. Any changes made for RAND could be extended to certain other FCRCs which are similar to RAND. You should note that several of the FCRCs including RAND have contracts with non-security federal agencies and local governments; some even are negotiating contracts with foreign organizations.

2. RAND's complaints are:

--RAND believes that non-profit making research centers like RAND should not have the same constraints as profit-oriented research centers and should receive sensitive intelligence items. (The argument is that the efforts of profit-making outfits are usually confined to specific projects; FCRC centers like RAND are engaged in basic, long-term policy-oriented research. To do this, they must have access to privileged information. This argument may be true, but it is irrelevant.)

--Use of the terms "controlled dissem" and "sensitive sources and methods" inhibits dissemination of unique intelligence to RAND.

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3. The USIB rules governing release of intelligence to contractors make clear that special permission must be granted in writing from the originator of all sensitive intelligence reports, i.e., those marked "controlled dissem," etc. RAND says that this procedure delays their receipt of this information for as much as six months. In effect, RAND is pleading to waive this USIB policy. RAND does have a legitimate complaint on the time-lag problem, but their complaint should be made to their sponsoring agency, the Air Force, not to CIA.

4. I believe this is one of those instances where your responsibility for protecting sensitive sources and methods is at issue. Despite the assurances regarding RAND's security measures (made by Donald Rice in his attached memorandum), [redacted] STAT With this precedent on the books, there would be an uproar on Capitol Hill and even at PFIAB if there were another leak of sensitive intelligence to the public (or any other unauthorized recipient).

5. I suggest we discuss this matter. Unless you can convince me otherwise, I will recommend that you inform RAND we can make no exceptions to our present policy on disseminating sensitive intelligence to contractors like RAND.

[redacted] STAT

EDWARD W. PROCTOR
Deputy Director for Intelligence

Attachment

STAT O/DDI: [redacted] :lm (1 May 74)

Distribution:
Orig + 1 - Addressee
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - D/CRS
1 - DDI File (CRS)
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DDI

Executive Registry
74-5302/3

DCI/DDCI
Routing Slip

TO:

		ACTION	INFO.			ACTION	INFO.
1	DCI			11	LC		
2	DDCI			12	IG		
3	S/MC			13	Compt		
4	DDS&T			14	Asst/DCI		
5	DDI	✓		15	AO/DCI		
6	DDM&S			16	Ex/Sec		
7	DDO			17			
8	D/DCI/IC			18			
9	D/DCI/NIO			19			
10	GC			20			

SUSPENSE _____
Date

Remarks: You make a lot of sense — Could you draft a reply for me? — Could it include a look at time delay factors to see whether they could be accelerated?

DCI/~~DDCI~~
5/10/74

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